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In this paper, we formulate and estimate an economic model of labor supply and welfare 
participation. The model is estimated on data on single men from Quebec drawn from the 
1986  Canadian  Census.  Budget  sets  for  each  work-welfare  combination  -  accounting  for 
income taxes,  tax credits  and welfare benefit  rules  - are derived using a microsimulation 
model. We validate our model by comparing reactions to a welfare reform that implied a 
dramatic increase in welfare benefits predicted by our model to those obtained by using a 
regression discontinuity approach. The results show that our model is capable of recovering 
actual changes  in  labor supply  and welfare participation. We also show the advantage of 
having estimated a structural model by illustrating how labor supply and welfare participation 
change when benefit levels change. 
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Structural models that describe agents’ actions are common in a wide range
of topics in empirical economics and it is important to provide evidence on
the validity of such models. This is especially true given that such models
often rely on parametric or functional form assumptions. One validation
strategy is to compare how well predictions from the model compare with
actual observations and reject models that do not ﬁt the data. However, a
model whose outcomes compares favorably with the (within-sample) data
may not be able to correctly forecast the impact of the large changes. In-
deed, as mentioned in Keane and Wolpin (2006), forecasting the impact of
large changes in the economic environment is a great challenge for struc-
tural models. Thus, a more appropriate approach to validate the model is
to examine the behavioral implications of the model, in combination with
within-sample model ﬁt tests.
Ideally, validation of structural models requires access to randomized
social experiments or large policy changes. Unfortunately, such opportuni-
ties are rare. One example is McFadden (1977) who utilized a large regime
shift (the introduction of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART)) in his work on
forecasting the demand for rail transport in the San Francisco Bay area. He
estimated a structural model of travel demand before the introduction of
the BART system and compared the forecast generated by his model to ac-
tual usage after BART’s introduction. Wise (1985) exploited a randomized
social experiment involving housing subsidies to evaluate a model of hous-
ing demand. Lise et al (2003) used data from the Self-Sufﬁciency Project,
a Canadian large-scale experiment designed to move people off of wel-
fare and into work, to validate a calibrated search-matching model of labor
market behavior. Similarly, Todd and Wolpin (2006) used data from a large-
scale school subsidy experiment in Mexico, where villages were randomly
assigned to control and treatment groups. Using only the control villages,
they estimated a behavioral model of parental decisions about child school-
ing and work, as well as family fertility. The validity of the model was then
assessed according to how well it could predict the behavior of households
3in the treatment villages. Finally, Keane and Wolpin (2006) used a “non-
random holdout sample” instead of a randomized social experiment or a
large policy change. Their holdout sample differed signiﬁcantly from the
estimation sample along the policy dimension that the model was meant to
forecast.
In this paper we exploit large policy change that took place in the Cana-
dian province of Quebec in 1989. Prior to the change, unattached persons
younger than 30 years old received substantially less in welfare payments
than similar individuals 30 years of age or older.1 This form of age dis-
crimination was terminated in 1989 when monthly beneﬁts increased from
$185 to $507 (an increase of 175%) for those younger than 30 years old. A
similarly large policy change is unlikely to happen again and it provides an
opportunity for researchers to evaluate the impact of dramatic increases in
welfare generosity on welfare use. Indeed, this policy has been utilized to
assess how the beneﬁt increase affected duration of welfare spells (Fortin
et al, 2006) and the impact on employment and welfare participation rates
(Lemieux and Milligan, 2008).
Our approach to validate our structural model is somewhat different
from that used by McFadden (1977) who also utilized a large policy change.
In particular, we ﬁrst estimate our model on data from the 1986 Census
(this Census was also used by Lemieux and Milligan, 2008). We then use
our estimated preference parameters and predict outcomes given changes
in the welfare beneﬁt rules corresponding to the policy change. Finally, we
compare our estimated impacts on employment and welfare participation
with those obtained using a regression discontinuity (RD) approach. We
also compare our results with those in Lemieux and Milligan (2008).
This paper makes two major contributions to the literature. First, we
are able to assess the performance of a structural model of labor supply
and welfare participation beyond a simple comparison of actual and pre-
dicted distributions of hours of work and welfare use. This should be very
valuable as the capacity of this type of labor supply models to recover true
1Recipients were required to complete a form each month allowing ofﬁcials to determine
if respondents had reached age 30.
4effects under stringent parametric assumptions is virtually unknown.
Secondly, this paper illustrates the beneﬁts of having access to a set
of estimated preference parameters along with a structural model of labor
supply behavior. In particular, our model allows us to recover a distribu-
tion of welfare responses as we marginally change beneﬁt levels. This dis-
tribution is not identiﬁed in studies such as Lemieux and Milligan (2008),
where only a single effect corresponding to a particular beneﬁt change is
identiﬁed.
Our results are encouraging as our preferred model speciﬁcation pre-
dicts employment reductions, as a result of the dramatic increase in welfare
beneﬁts, similar to those obtained using RD. We also show that the changes
in labor supply and welfare use are smaller for high school graduates than
for high school drop-outs. Moreover, the effects are largest among those
with lowest incomes. For those in the lowest income quartile, the beneﬁt
increase is predicted to reduce employment by 18 percent and increase wel-
fare particpation with 64 percent. Finally, we illustrate how employment,
welfare use and hours of work change as we marginally increase social
assistance beneﬁts. The responses to these beneﬁt changes are highly non-
linear which suggest that results from experimental studies may only be of
limited value when considering policy changes that differ from those used
in the experiment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
a description of the change in welfare beneﬁts that took place in Quebec
in 1989 as well as a brief description of the main features of the Quebec
income tax system. Section 3 presents the economic model and the empir-
ical speciﬁcation while Section 4 describes extensions of the basic model.
The data used in the analysis is presented in Section 5 and the results are
discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Social Assistance and Income Taxes in Quebec
Prior to 1996, Canada’s social assistance (or welfare) system was admin-
istered under the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), an arrangement that al-
5lowed the cost of social policies to be shared by the federal government
and the provinces and territories. On April 1, 1996, the Canada Health and
Social Transfer (CHST) replaced the CAP and this meant that expenditures
on health, education and social assistance became provincial jurisdictions.
Consequently, there are thirteen distinct social policy systems in Canada
as each province and territory designs, administers and delivers one of
its own, although some federal assistance programs, most importantly the
Canada Child Tax Beneﬁt (CCTB), are also in place. All the provincial sys-
tems have complex rules which regulate the eligibility, rates of assistance,
amounts of income and assets exempted from the calculation of the needs
test, and other system speciﬁcs.
Unlike the U.S., social assistance in Canada provides any type of house-
hold, including those consisting of single persons without children, with
ﬁnancial support. In general, the only eligibility requirement is a house-
hold’s need, regardless of cause. Eligibility for social assistance is estab-
lished using a needs test.2 That is, the total value of a household’s non-
exempted assets is calculated and compared with the maximum allowable
level. Then, provided that a household’s assets do not exceed the allow-
able level, the household’s income from non-exempted sources is com-
pared with its basic needs (food, clothing, shelter and utilities, household
necessities, etc.), and if the cost of these basic needs exceeds the income, the
household is eligible for social assistance.
In Quebec, social assistance programs are administered by “Ministère
del’EmploietdelaSolidaritésociale”. Therearemanyassistanceprograms
available for Quebec residents. In order to be eligible for these programs,
individuals will have to meet certain criterions. For social assistance, eligi-
bility requires Quebec residency and that the applicant is 18 years or older,
in addition to passing the basic needs test.
Regarding income taxes, the Quebec system was - and still is - com-
posed of two parts, a provincial component and a federal component. In
2Although the obligation to conduct a needs test was abolished when the Canada Health
and Social Transfer replaced the Canada Assistance Plan in 1996, no province or territory
has yet disposed of it.
6general, similar tax rules regarding exemptions and deductions apply but
individuals ﬁle separate returns. However, the marginal tax rates as well
as the income levels at which they change differ between the two jurisdic-
tions. For example, in 1985 (the year for our analysis) there were 10 federal
tax brackets and 21 provincial tax brackets. The marginal tax rates are pre-
sented in Figure 1. The highest tax rate was 34 percent at the federal level
and 33 percent at the provincial level. These high tax rates applied to earn-
ings above $62,657 (federal) and $60,715 (provincial). Both the number of
tax brackets and the level of the tax rates were substantially reduced dur-
ing the late 1980s. During the same period, the basic tax exemption at the
federal level was increased, further lowering the average federal tax rate.
3 Economic Model and Empirical Speciﬁcation
The traditional way to model labor supply assumes that the decision vari-
able, hours of work, is continuous. However, this generally implies that
restrictive assumptions must be made in order to guarantee statistical co-
herency (see for instance the discussion in MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch
(1990)). Moreover, an underlying assumption in traditional labor supply
models is that the individual (or household) budget set is convex. Hence,
to estimate a continuous labor supply model, a number of important sim-
pliﬁcations of the income tax and transfer system must be made.
In this paper, we model labor supply as a discrete choice instead, fol-
lowing previous work by van Soest (1995), Hoynes (1996), Keane and Mof-
ﬁtt (1998), Blundell et al (2000), and Flood et al (2004). Unlike the continu-
ous labor supply model, the discrete choice model allows us to include as
many details as possible regarding the budget set. Speciﬁcally, we assume
that each individual can choose among all the alternatives in the choice set




, where j = 1,..., J.
Further, Lj = TE   hj where TE denotes total time endowment and is set
to 4,000 hours per year.3 Thus, the choice set for an individual contains J
3TE can also be regarded as a parameter that can be estimated together with all other
parameters.
7different hours of work combinations. In the empirical part of the paper,
we set J = 7.4
We assume that utility depends not only on income and leisure, but
also on participation in welfare programs. We further assume that the util-
ity function is increasing in income and leisure and decreasing in welfare
participation. The disutility from participation in a welfare program is as-
sumed to primarily reﬂect the non-monetary costs associated with partic-
ipation in such programs, such as ﬁxed costs or “stigma”, and is included
to account for nonparticipation among eligible individuals.5
Following van Soest (1995), we use a trans-log speciﬁcation of the direct
utility function, and for any speciﬁc individual we have











+ 2bNI,Llog(NI)log(L)   fSAdSA
where it is assumed that the disutility from receiving social assistance
(fSA) isseparablefromtheutilityofleisureandnetincome(followingMof-
ﬁtt (1983) and Hoynes (1996)).
The individual chooses leisure time (L), social assistance status (dSA)
and consumption (or net income) by maximizing utility subject to the fol-
lowing budget constraint:
NIj =Whj +Y   t













equals the before-tax hourly wage rate, Y denotes annual non-labor in-
come, t(.) is a function that determines income taxes, YT is taxable non-
labor income, and D represents deductions. Lastly, BSA(.) is a function that
4We set h1 = 0,h2 = 500,h3 = 1,000,h4 = 1,500,h5 = 2,000,h6 = 2,500 and h7 = 3,000.
5What may appear as “stigma” or disutility from welfare participation may also result
from the inability of the econometrician to measure true welfare eligibility. Moreover, im-
perfect information regarding beneﬁt eligibility on behalf of the individual is also included
in this non-monetary cost.
8determines social assistance beneﬁts.
The addition of the disutility of welfare participation implies that an in-
dividual faces 2J work-welfare possibilities. However, some welfare states
may be infeasible if the individual’s income from work is sufﬁciently high
to render him ineligible for SA. Solving the optimization problem requires
evaluating the utility function in (1) for each possible combination of hours
of work and welfare program participation and choosing the state that
yields the highest utility.
To make the model operational, random disturbances are added to the






where j represents the individual’s choice of labor supply, r represents
the individual’s welfare participation state and Uj,r denotes the individual
utility of choice (j,r). We assume that ej,r follows a type I extreme value





error term ej,r can be interpreted as an unobserved alternative speciﬁc util-
ity component or as an error in an individual’s assessment of the utility as-
sociated with choosing the work-welfare combination (j,r) (optimization
error). Given the distributional assumptions of the stochastic terms in the





















9and where dj,r is an indicator for the observed state for each individual.
4 Extensions of the Basic Model
4.1 Heterogeneity in Preferences
Previous studies have shown the importance of allowing for heterogeneity
in preferences (e.g. Flood et al (2004)). Here, we introduce heterogeneity in
















where the elements of the vector x are observed individual character-
istics (age, education and immigrant status). K denotes the dimension of
the vector x, while the q0s represent unobserved variables that affect pref-
erences for leisure, consumption and welfare.
It is reasonable to assume that an important source for population het-
erogeneity is unobserved. In order to account for this, we formulate a ﬁnite
mixture model, which allows for unobserved heterogeneity in a ﬂexible
way without imposing a parametric structure. This way of representing
unobserved heterogeneity is similar to what Heckman and Singer (1984)
suggested for duration data models. We assume that there exist M differ-
ent sets of (qL,qNI,qSA) that determine an individual’s preferences, each
observed with probability pm (where pm > 0 and åpm = 1, m = 1,..., M.
This speciﬁcation allows for an arbitrary correlation between the individ-
ual’s work effort, preference for consumption and preference for welfare
participation.
Given the distributional assumptions of the stochastic terms in the util-




























andwhere Q = fqL,qNI,qSAg. Thisexpressionsimplydenotestheprob-
ability that the utility in state (j,r) is the highest among all possible work-
welfare combinations, conditional on unobserved preferences.
4.2 Fixed Costs of Work
The model ﬁt obtained from the basic model reveals that such a simple rep-
resentation of preferences is unable to capture the observed distribution of
hours of work in our sample. In particular, the fraction of part-time work-
ers is overestimated and the peak around full-time is underestimated. A
similar problem has been noted in previous work (e.g. Dickens & Lund-
berg (1993), van Soest (1995), Aaberge et al (1995, 1999) and Flood et al
(2004)).
Aaberge et al (1995, 1999) address this issue by specifying a general
labor supply model that incorporates job offers with different contracted
hours of work. In this paper we adopt a simpler approach following van
Soest and Das (2001). In particular, we replace log(NI) for employed indi-
viduals with log(NI)   log(FC) where FC is a parameter to be estimated
that denotes ﬁxed costs of work. Since utility increases with income, posi-
tive costs (FC) reduce the utility of working while having no effect on the
utility associated with not working.6
6In addition to adding heterogeneity in preferences and ﬁxed costs of work, we have
115 Data
5.1 Description of the Data and Sampling Procedures
The data employed in this study are drawn from the 1986 Canadian Cen-
sus.7 The data are extracted from a sample of 500,434 individuals who ac-
countedforapproximately2%oftheCanadianpopulationatthetime.8 The
data contain detailed information on demographic, social and economic
data such as income, age, education and immigration status.
In this paper we attempt to obtain a sample that resembles the one used
in Lemieux & Milligan (2008) as much as possible. However, minor dif-
ferences exist since we do not have access to the restricted Census mas-
ter ﬁles. Like Lemieux & Milligan (2008), we restrict our sample to single
males without children residing in the province of Quebec in 1985. Fur-
ther, we remove males younger than 20 and older than 39 as of June 3rd in
1986. Unlike Lemieux & Milligan (2008), we remove married males from
the sample.9 While Lemieux & Milligan (2008) focus on a sample consisting
of those who dropped out of high school, we also include individuals who
have graduated from high school but have acquired no further education.
Removing high school graduates from our sample yields a sample of only
327 males. Our ﬁnal sample, including high school graduates, consists of
1,034 males.
5.2 Variable Deﬁnitions
In order to estimate our structural labor supply model, we need informa-
tion on individuals’ labor supply decisions. Furthermore, since we are
also explored the possibility that wages are measured with errors and that wages may be
endogenous. In both cases, we ﬁnd no evidence suggesting that incorporating these issues
into our model improve its performance. This ﬁnding is consistent with the results in van
Soest (1995).
7Speciﬁcally, we utilized the public use micro-data ﬁle on individuals from the 1986
Census of Canada.
8The target population for the 1986 Census includes all individuals except for institu-
tional residents and residents of incompletly enumerated Indian reserves or settlements.
9Including married individuals would necessitate a different economic model that ac-
counts for joint household decisions.
12also modeling individuals’ welfare decisions, we need information on wel-
fare participation as well. More importantly, our model assumes that indi-
viduals optimally select themselves into different work-welfare categories.
Thus, we need to calculate net (or disposable) income for each person and
each work-welfare alternative. These calculations are based on a small
micro-simulation model that we constructed using details from the 1985
Quebec and Federal Income Tax Schedules.10
In order to create annual hours of work for each individual, we combine
information on weeks worked in 1985 with hours worked in the reference
week (which occurred in 1986). It includes working for wages, salary, tips
or commission, working in own business, farm or professional practice, or
working without pay in a family business or farm owned or operated by a
relative living in the same household. We excluded males who worked less
than13weeksandthosewhoworkedlessthan4hoursduringthereference
week. We further removed males who reported more than 3,640 hours of
work in 1985.
The 1986 Census collects yearly wage and salary income, which refers
to gross wages and salaries before deductions for items such as income
tax. Military pay and allowances, tips, commissions, bonuses and piece-
rate payments as well as occasional earnings in 1985 are also included in
this variable. Hourly wages are calculated by dividing the yearly wage
and salary income measure by our constructed measure of annual hours of
work. We exclude males who received self-employment income and those
whose hourly wage fell below the minimum wage level in Quebec in 1985.
Moreover, we excluded males whose hourly wage exceeded $68.
Unfortunately, the Census data contain no direct information on social
assistance (or welfare). However, there is information on whether the re-
spondent received any government transfer payments apart from child re-
lated transfers (family allowances and federal child tax credits), pensions
(Old Age Security, Guaranteed Income Supplements and Canada/Quebec
Pension) and unemployment insurance beneﬁts. For our sample of single,
10We utilized information on tax and beneﬁt parameters kindly provided by Kevin Mil-
ligan.
13young males, we believe that this measure provides a reasonable measure
of social assistance receipt. As mentioned in Lemiuex & Milligan (2008),
“... social assistance beneﬁts are by far the largest component of the “other
transfers” variable”.11
5.3 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1 we present average employment and welfare participation rates
forasamplethatincludesbothhighschooldrop-outsandhighschoolgrad-
uates as well as separately for the two groups. The employment rates
are substantially lower for males without a high school diploma. Deﬁn-
ing employment using information on weeks worked in 1985, the employ-
ment rate is 0.607 for high school drop-outs while it is 0.867 for those with
high school as their highest degree. An alternative employment deﬁnition,
based on work status during the Census reference week, is available in the
data. Again, we ﬁnd that there is a large employment gap between the two
groups, 0.638 for drop-outs compared to 0.897 for high school graduates.
Regardless of deﬁnition, the employment rates for high school drop-outs
are comparable to those presented in Lemieux and Milligan (2008).
Table 1 also shows the proportion of respondents that received any so-
cial assistance beneﬁts. As for employment rates, there are large differences
in welfare participation across educational attainment and the proportion
of recipients among high school graduates is 0.107 while it is 0.252 for high
school drop-outs. The ﬁgure for the latter group again compares favorably
to the proportion in Lemieux and Milligan (2008). Overall, labor market
outcomes of our sample of high school drop-outs is quite similar to those
presented in Lemieux and Milligan (2008), although the sample sizes differ.
In Table 2, we present sample averages of selected individual character-
istics in our sample, separate for those with and without social assistance.
As shown in Table 1, Table 2 reveals that welfare participants generally
have lower educational attainment (only 48.1 percent are high school grad-
11Lemieux and Milligan (2004) show that 85 percent of income included in “other trans-
fers” in the Census is social assistance payments.
14uates). Furthermore, welfare recipients are slightly older while the fraction
of the sample that was born in a foreign country is higher among those who
did not receive welfare. Finally, only a small fraction of those who received
welfare were employed.12 Also, for the welfare recipients who worked,
they worked fewer hours than those who did not claim welfare beneﬁts
(250 hours per year versus 1,680 hours).
6 Results
6.1 Model Comparison and Validation
We have estimated a number of different speciﬁcations of the structural
labor supply model described above and used the estimated preference
parameters to predict changes in employment and welfare use as a result
of the introduction of higher welfare beneﬁts for those under the age of
30. The results are presented in Table 3.13 We assess each speciﬁcation us-
ing three critieria. First, we compare predictions of annual hours of work
with those observed in the data. Using the seven classes of hours of work,
we calculate a goodness-of-ﬁt statistic that is chi-square distributed. These
statistics are reported in column one. Secondly, we compare the predicted
changes in employment and welfare use with those obtained using Regres-
sion Discontinuity methods. Finally, we use the Akaike information criteria
to further discriminate among the model speciﬁcations.
The ﬁrst set of rows show results from model speciﬁcations where the
preference parameters associated with leisure, consumption and welfare
are parameterized as functions of observed characteristics (age, education
and immigrant status) but where there is no unobserved heterogeneity em-
bedded in the preferences. Within this class of models, we considered al-
ternative representations of costs of work (see Section 4.2 above). First, the
model was estimated ignoring such costs altogether. The model ﬁt statistic
12This is true regardless of how employment is deﬁned (employment rate last year or
during Census week). The employment rate in Table 2 is based on employment rate last
year.
13Complete estimation results are available upon request.
15in this case is large (287.8) and the null hypothesis of similarity between
model predictions and data is rejected. Hence, this model speciﬁcation
does not pass the ﬁrst of our validation criteria. Furthermore, the estimated
impacts of the welfare reform on employment and social assistance are sub-
stantially smaller than those obtained using RD.
The second model speciﬁcation, within the class of models that assume
awayunobservedheterogeneity, includesanadditionalparameterdesigned
topickupmonetaryandnon-monetarycostsassociatedwithdifferenthours
of work arrangements. Although the addition of this parameter substan-
tially improves the model ﬁt (the chi-square statistic drops from 287.8 to
74.5) the null hypothesis of similarity between model predictions and data
is still rejected. The simulated impacts of the welfare reform on employ-
ment and welfare use are substantially larger than for the model without
a control for ﬁxed costs of work. The impacts are also larger than those
obtained using RD. Thus, although the addition of ﬁxed costs to the model
speciﬁcation improved the performance of the model, it does not pass the
validation criteria discussed above.
The remaining sets of results in Table 3 are all based on model speciﬁ-
cations where we have added unobserved heterogeneity to the preferences
for leisure, consumption and welfare use as discussed in Section 4.1 above.
As is generally the case with these type of models, we start by assuming
a distribution with two support points and then proceed if there is an im-
provement in AIC.
The results obtained with two support points suggest a dramatic im-
provement in model ﬁt for the model speciﬁcation with ﬁxed costs.14 Ac-
cording to all three selection criteria, the model with unobserved hetero-
geneity outperforms the one without these heterogeneity terms. As we
add support points, performance improve and for the speciﬁcation with
four types, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that model predictions and
data are similarly allocated across the seven hours classes. Moreover, the
estimated effects of the welfare reform on employment and welfare partic-
14Given the inferior performance of the model without ﬁxed costs above, we do not con-
sider that model speciﬁcation further.
16ipation are close to those obtained using RD. The employment rate is pre-
dicted to decrease with 3.8 percentage points (compared to 4.1 using RD)
while social assistance is predicted to increase with 3.6 percentage points
(compared to 1.3 using RD). Further, annual hours of work are predicted to
drop with 3.4 percentage points using our model and with 2.6 percentage
points using RD.
The effects on both the employment and welfare participation rates are
similar to those reported in Lemieux and Milligan (2008). Their RD esti-
mates are 4.9 and 4.1 percentage points for employment and welfare, re-
spectively. Hence, this model speciﬁcation performs quite well, suggesting
that it may be considered for evaluation of a range of beneﬁt changes. The
standard errors for both our RD estimates as well as for our model effects
are however relatively large. The limited sample size is a likely reason for
these inﬂated standard errors.
Finally, the AIC for the model with four support points is 3972. This is
lower than the corresponding values for any of the models with fewer sup-
port points. Adding addional number of support points did not improve
the model ﬁt nor did it lower the AIC. Thus, using our validation criteria,
we determined that the appropriate number of support points is four.15
To summarize, the model speciﬁcations that include unobserved het-
erogeneity in preferences for leisure, consumption and welfare and that
also incorporate some measure of non-monetary and monetary costs asso-
ciated with working provide estimated effects of the 1989 welfare reform
that closely resembles the true effects, as estimated by RD on our sample
and by Lemieux and Milligan (2008). In addition to this external valida-
tion, they also generate hours distributions that are similar to the observed
distribution. It is perhaps remarkable, but certainly encouraging, how well
this relatively simple model performs, especially given the large change in
policy environment that the reform implied.
15Cameron and Taber (1998) also use AIC to estimate the number of support points in
their Monte Carlo study of dynamic, discrete choice models.
176.2 Heterogeneity in Responses to the Welfare Reform
As noted above in Section 5.1, our sample includes both high school drop-
outs and high school graduates. However, we allow the preference pa-
rameters for consumption, leisure and welfare to depend on educational
attainment and we can therefore obtain effects of the welfare reform sep-
arately for the two groups. This will enable us to compare our predicted
responses to those reported in Lemieux and Milligan (2008) who used a
sample of high school drop-outs.
InTable4wepresentestimatedimpactsofthereformfordifferentgroups
usingestimatedbehavioralparametersfromamodelthataccountsforﬁxed
costs of work and that assumes a four-support distribution for unobserved
heterogeneity. For high school drop-outs, the reduction in the employment
rate is 4.9 percentage points (or 7.7 percent). This ﬁgure is identical to that
reported by Lemieux and Milligan (2008), providing additional support
for the validity of our structural model. The predicted increase in social
assistance use for high school drop-outs is 4.3 percentage points, which
compares very favorable to the 4.1 point increase reported in Lemieux and
Milligan (2008). Finally, the reform is predicted to reduce annual hours
of work for this group by 43 hours which corresponds to a 3.7 percent re-
duction. We also note that all of the impact of the reform happens at the
extensive margin (participation) instead of the intensive margin (hours of
work conditional on working). Similar ﬁndings were reported in Lemieux
and Milligan (2008).
Table 4 also shows the estimated effects of the reform for high school
graduates and separately for natives and immigrants. The changes in labor
supply and welfare use are smaller for high school graduates than for high
school drop-outs. For example, the employment rate effect is about two
thirds of that for high school drop-outs. It is also noteworthy that natives
respond more to beneﬁt changes than immigrants.
Finally, Table 4 shows the reform’s impact on males located at different
places in the distribution of net incomes. As expected, the effects are largest
among those with lowest incomes (those in the ﬁrst quartile). Moving up
18the income distribution, the effects of the reform fade and among those in
the top quartile, the beneﬁt increase has no effect on either labor supply or
welfare participation.
To summarize, the entries in Table 4 provide additional insights, be-
yond those obtained using Regression Discontinuity estimates, into the ex-
pected effects of a very large beneﬁt increase for a portion of the popu-
lation. In addition to provide support for our simple structural model of
labor supply behavior, the results in Table 4 show how the reform will im-
pact behavior among different groups in the population.
6.3 Labor Supply and Welfare Responses to Alternative Beneﬁt
Changes
A major limitation of studies exploiting “natural” experiments is the in-
ability of extrapolating the results to other policy changes. The responses
estimated using RD methods apply to a particular welfare reform where
beneﬁts for those under the age of 30 increased with 175 percent. Not only
are such policy changes extremely rare, they are also unlikely to provide
substantive guidance to current policy makers as most modiﬁcations to im-
portant policy parameters are much smaller in magnitude. For example,
our RD estimates cannot be used to infer how labor supply and welfare
use would change if beneﬁts would have increased with 50 percent instead
of 175 percent. On the other hand, with estimated preference parameters
from a structural labor supply model that has been validated, we can pre-




in these measures as we increase beneﬁts by $20 increments up to a total in-
crease of $300. The results are presented in Figure 2. As can be seen, the
responses to beneﬁt changes are highly non-linear. For example, for mod-
est increases ($60 or less per month), there are small increases in welfare
use and small reductions in labor supply. However, an increase of $100 per
19month is predicted to increase welfare use by 2 percentage points as well
as reduce employment by a similar magnitude.
7 Conclusions
Inthispaper, weformulateandestimatearelativelysimpleeconomicmodel
of labor supply and welfare participation. We then validate our model us-
ing a welfare reform that took place in the province of Quebec in 1989 and
that implied a dramatic increase in welfare beneﬁts for those under the age
of 30. In particular, we compare our model predictions with those obtained
using Regression Discontinuity methods. We explore different model spec-
iﬁcations and document the importance of accounting for costs associated
with work as well as unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. The results
are encouraging. Our models predict employment reductions that are close
to the Regression Discontinuity estimates.
We also illustrate the existence of heterogeneity in responses to the wel-
fare reform. The changes in labor supply and welfare use are smaller for
high school graduates than for high school drop-outs. Moreover, the effects
are largest among those with lowest incomes. For those in the lowest quar-
tile, the beneﬁt increase is predicted to reduce employment by 18 percent
and increase welfare use with 64 percent.
A major limitation of studies exploiting “natural” experiments is the
inability of extrapolating the results to other policy changes. For example,
our Regression Discontinuity estimates show responses to a welfare reform
wherebeneﬁtsforthoseundertheageof30increasedwith175percent. Not
only are such policy changes extremely rare, they are also unlikely to pro-
vide substantive guidance to current policy makers as most modiﬁcations
to important policy parameters are smaller in magnitude. However, with
estimated preference parameters from a structural labor supply model, we
canpredictemploymentandwelfareutilizationchangesresultingfromany
change in beneﬁt levels.
We illustrate how employment, welfare use and hours of work change
as we marginally increase social assistance beneﬁts. The responses to these
20beneﬁt changes are highly non-linear. For modest increases ($60 or less
per month), there are small increases in welfare use and small reductions
in labor supply. However, an increase of $100 per month is predicted to
increase welfare use by 2 percentage points as well as reduce employment
by a similar magnitude. Thus, results from experiemental studies may only
be of limited value when evaluating policy changes that differ from those
used in the experiment.
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23Table 1.
Employment and Social Assistance Rates
in the 1986 Canadian Census
Employment Rate Employment Rate Social Assistance
Last Year at Census Date Use
Full Sample 0.785 0.815 0.153
High School Drop-outs 0.607 0.638 0.252
High School Graduates 0.867 0.897 0.107
24Table 2.
Sample Averages by Welfare Status
Variable No Welfare (st dev) Welfare (st dev)
Age 29.6 (5.2) 31.5 (5.4)
High School Graduate 0.72 (0.45) 0.48 (0.50)
Immigrant 0.07 (0.25) 0.04 (0.21)
Hours of Work 1,676 (787) 254 (636)
Wage/hour 12.1 (5.4) 11.2 (2.2)
Employment Rate 0.90 (0.3) 0.16 (0.37)














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 < hours <= 500 1.0 0.7
500 < hours <= 1,000 8.6 8.2
1,000 < hours <= 1,500 7.5 7.7
1,500 < hours <= 2,000 23.9 21.6
2,000 < hours <= 2,500 31.0 31.7
2,500 < hours 6.6 8.6
28Table 6.
Estimated Parameters of the Preferred Model (speciﬁcation with
unobserved heterogeneity (four supports) and ﬁxed costs of work)
Parameters Estimates Std Err T-Stat
Preference for Leisure
bL(age) -0.06 0.08 -0.83
bL(highschool) -3.15 0.83 -3.78
bL(immigrant) 2.40 1.61 1.49
qL1 13.21 10.23 1.29
qL2 19.45 7.64 2.55
qL3 59.33 6.48 9.15
qL4 -0.26 17.10 -0.01
Preference for Consumption
bNI(age) 0.02 0.02 1.24
bNI(highschool) 0.09 0.11 0.81
bNI(immigrant) 0.09 0.15 0.61
qNI1 -17.54 8.47 -2.07
qNI2 -15.25 8.00 -1.91
qNI3 -5.69 4.28 -1.33
qNI4 -8.90 25.33 -0.35
29Table 6.
Continued
Parameters Estimates Std Err T-Stat
Preference for Welfare
bSA(age) -0.003 0.05 -0.06
bSA(highschool) 0.50 0.40 1.25
bSA(immigrant) 1.13 0.82 1.38
qSA1 1.06 1.56 0.68
qSA2 16.86 3.78 4.46
qSA3 2.01 1.41 1.43
qSA4 14.47 3.72 3.88
Other Utility Parameters
bNIsq -0.53 0.29 -1.84
bLsq -30.73 5.49 -5.60
bNI,L 3.74 2.00 1.87
FC 19.87 6.18 3.21
Other
p1 -0.56 0.21 -2.72
p2 0.03 0.34 0.08
p3 -0.05 0.24 -0.21






















￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
32